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IRAN
A lecture delivered by

Mr. Edwin M. Wright
at the Naval War College
January 18, 1949
Iran, formerly called Persia by the West, is a large area of
628,000 square miles consisting mostly of rugged mountain ranges

higher than any in Europe and comparable to our western Rocky
Mountains in height, length and breadth. Similar to Utah, Nevada,
Idaho and Wyoming in appearance, it suffers from excessive arid

ity in most areas. While the great central desert plateau has an
elevation of three to four thousand feet, it receives only three to
four inches of annual rainfall and is therefore exceedingly sparsely
populated. The chains of mountains on the west and north catch
the moisture of rising currents of air and so are blessed with some
20 inches of rain per year while on the slopes of the Elburz, facing

the moisture laden winds crossing the Caspian Sea, a total of 60-80
inches of rainfall affords life to a mass of tall and tangled jungle
growth. On the steamy Caspian Sea coast, these jungles have been
cut down and intensive rice cultivation has been introduced, thus
supplying livelihood to the most concentrated population in the
country.

Geography has had an important role to play in the history
of Iran. The jagged mountain barriers have tended to isolate the

people from the Arabs to the west, the Slavic hordes to the north,
and the Indic masses to the east. Yet natural passes through the
mountains have tended to make Iran a bridge of communications

for great migrations and trade. Since antiquity, the great silk route
from China to the shores of the Mediterranean traversed Iran,,
Mr. Wright was born in Iran and is at present with the State Dec
partment as Special Assistant to the Director of Near Eastern and
African Affairs.
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witnessing invasions of Indo-Iranian tribes as early as the XII
Century B. C., to be followed by Parthians, Greeks, Huns, Turks,

Arabs and Mongols. While the gates of the Caucasus successfully
held off the pressures of the Slav for centuries, they finally were
captured in the early Nineteenth Century by Russia, exposing Iran

also to infiltration from the north. So, while the almost impassible
mountains have helped to preserve a definite Iranian culture and

people, the great highways and Iran's strategical position have in
vited numerous incursions, thus creating strong racial, linguistic
and cultural cleavages. The 14 to 16 million people can be classified

several ways: as mountain tribesmen, agricultural peasants or town
dwellers. Linguistically, one fin�s the major languages are: Per-·

sian, Kurdish and Turkish, with emphatic dialectical differentiations
such as Luri, Gilaki and Bakhtivari in each group. In addition,
Arabic, Syriac and Armenian are native languages spoken by minor

ity communities. Economically, there is a small privileged land
holding aristocracy, a small artisan town class and a large share-.
cropping agricultural peasantry. Education is limited to a few in

the cities and towns and most of the population is illiterate. With all
this deep and ancient diversification of patterns, there is a basic
Iranian unity of character that has survived.
The Iranian is usually hospitable and courteous but, because
of centuries of conquests, he is also suspicious of strangers. He is

· conscientious regarding the welfare of his family and helping his
friends, but he lacks broader social responsibility. He works hard
for meager returns. Ages of poverty have dulled his sensitiveness
.
'
.
.
!
to general human suffering. Herodotus, in the IV Century BC, remarked that, of all nations, the Persians were the quickest to adopt
foreign traditions. This adjustability has had both good and bad
effects on Iranian character. While at times they have superficially
I
borrowed the outward forms of a strange culture, they have failed
to grasp its inner values. Yet in other cases they have seized the
kernel of a foreign idea, synthesized it with the genius of their own
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and created a new and richer culture. Borrowing the art forms of
the Assyrians, they made them more graceful and vital in their
own distinctive Persian developments. In their religious contribu
tions they permanently enriched both Judaism and Christianity. In
military tactics, they evolved both positional warfare by building
heavy stone castles a thousand years before they appeared in
Europe, and by the Second Century A. D. they created the heavily
armed Kataphracti or armored Knight, who dominated military
tactics during the middle ages in Europe. Taken all in all, the
Iranian contribution to the west is impressive both in quantity and
quality.
Up to the begnning of the sixteenth century Iran occupied
a central position in the world's stage and both received and
radiated influences to regions ranging as far as from China to the
Atlantic. However,, the revolution in geography that came about
as a result of the discovery of the western world and the circum
navigation of the globe, dislocated Iran's world orientation, disrupt
ed her trade and radically reduced her importance. An era of in
ternal stagnation made Iran an easy prey to prowling imperial
forces. Russia launched a series of aggressive wars, detaching
province after province from the north, while Great Britain in the
Nineteenth Century, anxious to create a buffer state between Rus
sia and India, assisted in splitting off the eastern provinces to form
the puppet state of Afghanistan.
By the beginning of this century, it looked as though Iran
had come to the end of her long and remarkable national life. In
ternal decay had almost paralyzed all phases of national life. In
the early 1900's th� mounting tensions in Europe, associated with
the rise of Germany, stimulated Great Britain to find a potential
ally in Russia. So, in 1905 the British sent Sir Arthur Nicholson as
Ambassador to St. Petersburg with instructions to sound out Rus
sian desires. Russia eventually replied that she would favor an
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agreement with Great Britain, thus isolating Germany, if Great
Britain would recognize primary Russian interests in certain parts
of the Far East, Tibet and in Iran. Here Russia touched a tender
spot in the British strategy of defending her Empire, for Iran con
trols the land approaches to both the Suez Canal and India and
also would afford Russia free access to the seven seas. Yet the
necessity of weaning Russia away from Germany was so great
that by 1907 · Great Britain and Russia signed a secret partition
of Iran, by which Russia was granted a large area in the north for
"a special sphere of interest" while Great Britain retained a broad
strip controlling the Persian Gulf. Iran was not consulted. Dra
matic events soon followed in both spheres. The Russians soon
found excuse to intervene in a military way and occupy northern
Iran, while in the south the British struck oil in deposits so rich
that there soon followed an international scramble for the rights
and control of this fabulous discovery of wealth and power. The
events of 1907 were epochal for Iran inasmuch as they brought that
almost forgotten country once more under the focus of world in
terest. Russian penetration and oil remain the keys to understand. ing the theme of subsequent history in Iran. Let me belabor
these two points for a few moments. First that of Russian pene
tration.
As early as 1906, the Czars had indicated that they desired
all of Iran as the price of entering an entente with Great Britian.
The introduction of Russian troops in all northern Iran in 1909
had only half realized the Russian goal, but this aroused a nascent
nationalism in Iran which resulted in an appeal to the United States
for help. In order to strengthen Iranian independence, the United
States recommended a financial adviser, Mr. Morgan Shuster, to
assist Iran. But soon after his arrival in 1910, he ran afoul Russian
intrigues and under pressure of Russian threats, he was expelled
from Iran. His book "The Strangling of Persia" became a classic
study of the tactics of encroachment by a great power.
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During World War I, Iran became a battlefield. Russian
forces used Iran as a corridor through which to outflank Turkey.
Germany organized a Fifth Column with which to attack the oil

wells while the British introduced forces to protect them. Iran was
impoverished and all central authority crushed by these events put
a strong resentment toward Europe had developed-a xenophobia

that was to mould Iranian foreign policy for the next generation.
Iran wanted no vestige of foreign influence to remain but there
•. was no internal power to implement this desire. However, chaos
gave birth to a rampant nationalism which was seized upon by a

clever, stubborn but uneducated army officer called Riza Khan. By
a series of coup d'etats, he took hold of the reins of authority, in

jected some discipline in the army and rapidly promoted himself
. through successive steps to Prime Minister. In 1925, he exiled the
inept, worthless, degenerate monarch, Ahmed Shah, and followed
this the next year by crowning himself King. Having gained supreme
authority, Riza Shah launched Iran on a program of reforms and
)

development, totalling a capital investment of nearly $250,000,000

by 1939, which amazed everyone. Iranian life underwent drastic
adjustments in an effort to make Iran self-sufficient and to cut·
loose from all foreign penetration. The plan borrowed many details

from that promulgated by Mustafa Kemal of Turkey but it had

glaring defects. Riza Shah developed a megalomania, a vindictive

ness and greed which sabotaged much of the good at which his re

forms were aimed. So, while outwardly great strides were made in
security, education, health, transportation and centralization of au

thority, an excessive price was paid in the growth of graft and in

depressing the purchasing power of the peasantry. However, the
period 1925-39 was one of outward splendor and independence.

The U. S. S. R. had officially kept a proper attitude toward

Iran but with ,the sign of an international war appearing in 1936

when Italy attacked Ethiopia and. the Spanish Civil War broke out,
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large groups of Soviet trained Iranian revolutionaries were secret
ly sent to Iran to penetrate and capture the immature laboring
groups and idealistic intelligentia. They were unusually successful
in spite of police raids and vigilance, so that by 1939, there was a
sut?stantial and c,ompetent Soviet Fifth Column prepared to operate.
Then in the fateful Nazi-Soviet Pacts of 1940, the USSR insisted
"that its territorial aspirations center south of the national terri
tory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." Thus
Iran lay directly athwart the path of Soviet expansion. Assured by
Germany of a free hand, the USSR began to look for a pretext for
intervention. It came from an unexpected quarter a year later,
three months after Hitler had violated his pact and attacked the
Soviet Union from the west.
Iran desperately clung to the hope that she could remain
neutral but the presence of a small German colony added to the need
for opening a route by which supplies could reach the Soviet Union
and prompted the USSR and Great Britain to send in troops on
August 25, 1941. Resistance collapsed in four days, while in the
wake of the Red Army there appeared a well trained cadre of agita
tors, labor organizers and terrorists, who at once began to infiltrate
the army, the government, labor groups and political organizations.
This process was slowed because of the presence of British and U.S.
troops who were handling Lend Lease shipments across Iran, and
because President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at the Teheran Con
ference in December 1943 persuaded Mr. Stalin to sign the agree
ment declaring a common desire to protect the integrity of Iran. •
But as World War II came to a close in Europe and Asia, the ma
chinery of rebellion was placed in motion and under the protection
of Red guns, an autonomous government was established in Azar
baijan, Iran's richest province adjoining the Soviet border. Then
after all other foreign troops had left, and in violation of treaty
agreements, the Red Army remained in Iran until the Kremlin felt
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that it had established firmly the puppet government of Azarbaijan
and, through obtaining a joint. Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, had
guaranteed future domination of all northern Iran. This activity led

to a heated clash at the United Nations when Iran complained of
Soviet interference in her internal affairs and the United States

took the lead in challenging Soviet activity. By March 1946 the
East-West clash was obvious and Iran had been the first issue to
expose it.
During the past three years the Soviet Union has pulled out
every stop except that of open military invasion, to try to break
down the will of Iran to resist. Diplomatic threats, military demon
strations across the border, radio blasts, fomenting of strikes and
accusations of pl9tting aggression against the USSR; all these have
failed to bend Iran to submission. Increasing royalties from oil pro
duction and advice from U. S. military missions have aided Iran
during this period of tension. And, although temporarily frustrated,

the USSR still considers Iran the center of her territorial aspirations,
because the Soviet leaders know that, with Iran in their grasp, all

land communications between Asia and Europe would be disrupted
and new continents exposed to the march of revolution.

Iran was the goal of many a conqueror because of her val
uable position as related to communication. But to this prize of
Iran has been added that of vast oil resources discovered, as I
mentioned, in 1907. Although the estimates of oil reserves is

quoted at four billion barrels, less than one-sixth of the country
has been explored. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company holding the con
cession is fifty-five percent a British Government investment. The
peculiar geology of the oil domes makes it possible to extract im
mense quantities of oil with a small investment. From about sixty
five wells, a total of 500,000 barrels a day is being produced. One

well at Gaj Saran, brought in in 1913, is still producing nearly 7,000
barrels per day without being put to the pump. Its total production
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I

in thirty-five years has totalled nearly 90,000,000 barrels, and it
seems capable of continuing this indefinitely. The average well in
the U.S. A. brings in twelve barrels per day. This valuable asset was
of vital importance during the past war. Iranian oil was the main
source of power for the British Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies,
the U.S. Ninth Air Force while stationed in Egypt and Chennault's
Tigers in China. It supplied these needs in addition to the civilian
demands of the Near East and India as well as West Africa. Last
year U.S. marketers, such as Socony Vacuum and Standard Oil of
New Jersey, negotiated for a purchase of $250,000,000 of Iranian
oil with which to supply their European markets.
Oil has thus become a dramatic element in Iranian life. It
makes possible those economic developments which will end the
age old poverty under which Iran has suffered. It contributes to the
development of Europe and to safeguarding our own oil resources.
But these very factors make it a danger to the survival of Iran as an
independent state. While the Soviet Union is on the prowl and
hoping to seize Iran both for its central strategic position and its
petroleum wealth, Iran finds itself under heavy strain to survive.
It has one more chance. If it can develop responsible leadership,
utilize its resources honestly and develop a social conscience, then
class and regional separatism will decrease and a healthy nation will
face its tasks with high hopes of a national future. Again the
United States will be called upon for help. About 600 Iranian. stu
dents are now being educated in graduate and post graduate
courses in the U. S. A. American engineers are advising on a large
seven year economic development plan. U. S. dollars will be asked
to supply a part of the machinery essential for economic exploita
tion of Iran's wealth.
So the turning wheel of fate has brought these two countries,
Iran and the U. S. A., one of the world's oldest and one of the new
est, into close and intimate association. Each one needs the con-
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tribution of the other toward building a healthy and stable world
society. And while we still represent the greatest warehouse and

arsenal of democracy, Iran holds a position on the front line com
bating totalitarianism and aggression. In spite of all her weak

nesses and defects, Iran has shown a will to survive. Only there
was the iron curtain pushed back by the determination of its own
�eople. And where such a will to be . independent exists, it de
serves our encouragement and cooperation.
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